This study tested opposing predictions made by Gamson's Minimum Resource Theory and equity theory concerning the type of coalitions that are formed when members of a triad expect that rewards will be correlated with amounts of individual resources. Results supported equity theory in that subjects, whose work on a pretask was used as the basis for assigning resources in a bargaining game, formed conservative (strong against weak) coalitions. When subjects either did not work or were paid prior to playing the game, results replicated past research in that there was a tendency to form revolutionary (weak against strong) coalitions. Findings were discussed in terms of their implications for the generality of existing theories of coalition formation.
This study tested opposing predictions made by Gamson's Minimum Resource Theory and equity theory concerning the type of coalitions that are formed when members of a triad expect that rewards will be correlated with amounts of individual resources. Results supported equity theory in that subjects, whose work on a pretask was used as the basis for assigning resources in a bargaining game, formed conservative (strong against weak) coalitions. When subjects either did not work or were paid prior to playing the game, results replicated past research in that there was a tendency to form revolutionary (weak against strong) coalitions. Findings were discussed in terms of their implications for the generality of existing theories of coalition formation.
The present study was an investigation of the role that the norm of equity plays in the formation of coalitions within triads. Past research on coalition formation (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) to a large extent has focused on the effect of differences in apparent power. Typically, power is denned as resources that enable their owner to achieve some goal; the greater the resources, the more easily the goal is reached. For example, in one case of Caplow's (1956 Caplow's ( , 1968 Type 5 triad, resources are distributed in the ratios 4/3/2. Thus, the person with the greatest resources (4) will reach the goal first unless two participants pool their resources, that is, form a coalition.
In Type 5 triads, any coalition will triumph, since any combination of two sets of resources (e.g., 2 + 3, 2 + 4, or 3+4) is greater than the resources of the isolate. In spite of this equality in potential effectiveness, subjects in past studies have tended to overchoose the 2-3 combination and form what Caplow (1968) has termed "revolutionary" coalitions. This coalition is revolutionary because the two weaker parties join together to "overthrow" the person who originally had the most resources. A number of explanations have been advanced in attempts to understand why subjects favor the revolutionary coalition (e.g., Caplow, 1956 Caplow, , 1968 Gamson, 1961 Gamson, , 1964 Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Vinacke, 1969) . Of most relevance to the present research is Gamson's (1964) Minimum Resource Theory, which proposes that persons tend to form that winning coalition in which the sum of the resources is the least, since "any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition" (p. 87). Thus, in the 4/3/2 Type 5 triad, persons tend to form revolutionary coalitions because the minimum sum of the resources (5) is also a winning coalitions (since 5 > 4). Gamson (1964, pp. 103-104) further proposes that Minimum Resource Theory should be more applicable-that is, the tendency to form revolutionary coalitions should be greater-when persons (a) are highly motivated for the reward, and (b) have some basis for the perception that the magnitude of their resources should determine the magnitude of their reward. This latter hypothesis is of particular interest because it directly contradicts a prediction that can be derived from equity theory. Stated briefly, this hypothesis asserts that when persons perceive that their rewards should be contingent upon resources, they tend to form "conservative" coalitions in which the two stronger parties ally against the weakest. 1141
Equity theory-as developed by Adams (1965) and Homans (1961) , and extended by Leventhal (e.g., Leventhal & Lane, 1970; Leventhal & Michaels, 1969) and Messe (e.g., Lane, Messe", & Phillips, 1971; Messe, 1971 )-assumes that persons are satisfied with a distribution of rewards to the extent that it provides them with payments that are congruent with their inputs (i.e., perceived contributions). Thus, if persons are awarded resources as a function of inputs, then coalitions would form to the extent that they were necessary to allocate rewards equitably. In this case, the two stronger parties would coalesce to obtain the greater reward that they "deserved."
Equity theory, however, generates no predictions about coalition formation when resources are not associated with inputs-or any other basis that would legitimize their correlation with rewards. In this instance, it does seem reasonable that persons would act to protect themselves from the possibility that other members of the triad, especially the stronger members, might perceive that the correlation between resources and rewards was legitimate. This is not true, though, when differential inputs are used as the basis of resource allocation. In this latter situation, equity theory asserts that all parties should agree that such a correlation is appropriate, and, therefore-contrary to Gamson's hypothesis-they should form conservative coalitions to distribute rewards fairly.
The present research tested the validity of these two contrasting positions by examining the types of coalitions that are formed when work inputs are used as the basis for assigning resources. Also, to insure that the situation which was used in this examination approximated the relevant conditions that were present in past studies, coalition behavior also was observed when, as in prior research, the correlation between resources and inputs was absent.
METHOD

Subjects and Recruitment
Subjects were 54 male undergraduates who were selected by chance from over 200 respondents to an advertisement in the Michigan State University student newspaper. The advertisement solicited persons who were interested in earning money by participating in "motivational research." Since respondents knew that money was to be their only payment, it was expected that this procedure would provide subjects who were reasonably motivated by this reward.
Pretask and Inputs
A pretask was used to provide subjects in the appropriate conditions (see below) with differential inputs. The pretask consisted of two instruments: a "Test of General Knowledge," in mimeograph, which subjects had to proofread; and a series of lines, curves, and circles, which subjects had to complete into meaningful pictures. This set of "incomplete pictures" appeared at different points in the test booklet, depending upon the input condition of the subjects; the drawing task was always placed so that it appeared about midway in the subject's work period.
Inputs were manipulated through the duration of time for which subjects worked on the pretask. Some subjects worked for 2 hours, others for 14 hours or 1 hour; the remainder did not work at all.
Bargaining Game
Triads played a game for monetary rewards that was similar to those used in past studies of coalition formation (e.g., Vinacke & Arkoff. 1957) . Each member of a triad was given a small peg which he was to move along a cribbage board. There was a small cardboard flag with a numeral painted on it attached to each peg. One subject was given a peg marked with a 4, another was given a peg marked with a 3, and the third one that was marked with a 2.
Subjects were told to place their pegs at the same end of the board and move them when the experimenter said to do so. Each subject could, on a single move, advance his peg along the cribbage board the number of spaces that corresponded to the number on his flag (i.e., his resources). Thus, the subject with the peg marked 4 moved it four spaces each time, the subject with a resource weight of 3 moved his marker 3 spaces, and the remaining subject moved his peg 2 spaces.
Subjects were told that the party who won the game-that is, who reached the other end of the board first-would be awarded $7, while the two losers would have to agree on how to split the second prize of $2. It was obvious that the person with 4 resources would always win, so, "to make the game more interesting," two players could combine forces by trading in their pegs for a single peg whose number was the sum of their individual resources. In order to do this, the two players had to agree on how they would divide the winner's share ($7), knowing that the excluded person would receive the second prize ($2).
Design
Subjects were randomly assigned to triads in one of three conditions. In the inputs relevant to re-sources condition, members of a triad were given resources for the bargaining game as a function of how long they had worked on the pretask. Thus, the subject who had worked for 2 hours was given 4 resource points, the subject who had worked for li hours was given 3 points, and the subject who had worked for 1 hour was awarded 2 points. In the random resource condition, subjects, who had not worked on a pretask, were awarded 4, 3, or 2 points by chance. This condition is similar to the procedure used in many past studies of coalition formation. In the prepaid inputs condition, subjects were also assigned resources (4, 3, or 2 points) as a function of their work inputs (2, li, or 1 hour), but they were paid a standard amount of money for their work before they played the game for monetary rewards. This last condition was included to insure that any differences in behavior that occurred in the first two conditions were not due to "demand characteristics" that might have been generated by the experimenter in the inputs condition assigning resources as a function of time worked.
Procedure
In the input conditions, subjects in a triad were scheduled so that they finished their work at the same time. Thus, the li hour subject came to the experiment about 30 minutes after the 2 hour subject, while the 1 hour subject was scheduled to arrive 1 hour later. All subjects in a triad worked on their pretask in separate rooms.
When the time to work on the pretask had elapsed-or, in the no-inputs condition, when the three subjects had arrived-the members of a triad were taken to a small room and seated around a rectangular table. At this point, in the prepaidinputs condition, the subject who had worked 2 hours was given $4, the li hour subject was given $3, and the 1 hour subject was given $2. 1 At this point, in all triads, the experimenter explained the bargaining game as outlined above. In both input conditions, he gave the person who had worked 2 hours the peg marked 4, the person who worked li hours the peg marked 3, and the peg marked 2 to the person who worked 1 hour. He made sure that the subjects understood that resources were being distributed according to the amount of time that each person had worked (at a rate of 1 resource point per i hour of work). In the no-input condition, subjects selected among sealed envelopes which contained the pegs, so that assignment of resources obviously was determined by chance.
In all triads, the actual winner's share ($7) and the loser's share ($2) were always placed on the table before the game began so that subjects could see that the experimenter was serious about rewarding them in this manner. After the game was explained, including the possibility of forming "com-1 Prior research (Lane & Messi, 1972) has established that undergraduates perceive $2 an hour to be reasonably equitable pay.
binations," the experimenter answered any questions. Then he told the players to discuss among themselves, before the first "move," whether they would form a combination, if so, with whom and how the winner's share was going to be divided. He then remained silent until two of the players formed a coalition and agreed on a division of their reward. Thus, he did not interact with the subjects until, as he had explained to them, two of them handed in their pegs in exchange for a peg whose number was the sum of their individual resources; this action signified that a binding coalition had been formed.
When a coalition was formed, the experimenterwith the subjects' permission-declared its members to be the winners without having the players go through the motions of moving their pegs along the board. He then made sure that the members of the coalition divided the $7 as they had agreed and that the isolate received his $2. Finally, subjects were asked to write down individually why they behaved as they did in the game. When they completed this task, the experimenter thanked them for participating and allowed them to leave.
RESULTS
There were six triads assigned to each condition of the design. Table 1 presents the frequencies of each type of coalition that was formed in the three conditions. This array suggests strongly that the prediction derived from equity theory was more accurate than was the hypothesis that Gamson (1964) generated from Minimum Resource Theory, since conservative coalitions were formed in all six triads assigned to the inputs condition. Table 1 also reveals that the procedure used in the present study generated results that were equivalent to the usual findings of prior research in the two control conditions (i.e., in the no-inputs and the inputs-prepaid conditions) since subjects in these treatments tended to form the more typical, revolutionary coalition. Moreover, statistical analysis strongly supported these conclusions. An analysis of variance, which was performed on the sum of the resources of the coalition members, revealed an overall treatment effect, F(2, 15) = 8.90, p < .005. Further analysis indicated that there was essentially no difference in coalition formation between the no-inputs and the inputs-prepaid conditions (F = .18, df = 1,1S); however, as predicted by equity theory-but contrary to Gamson's assertionthe coalitions that were formed in the inputs condition were considerably more conservative than those in the other two treatments, F(2, 15) = 17.62, p < .01, Scheffe test.
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Analysis of the coalitions formed in the two control conditions through a binomial test indicated that, as in past research, revolutionary (2-3) coalitions tended to be formed more often than would be expected by chance (p < .064). Further, the exact distribution of coalitions in these two conditions approximates well that predicted by Walker (1973) in his refinement of Caplow's (19S6) theory; Table 2 presents these predicted and observed frequencies.
Finally, the subjects' postgame responses were examined to determine the extent to which they reported being concerned with equity, fairness, etc. when playing the game. This examination revealed that only 1 subject of the 36 assigned to the control conditions mentioned being concerned with equity, while 14 of the 18 subjects in the inputs condition did so, a highly significant difference, x 2 0) = 29.25, £<.0001. s These results are particularly striking in their support for equity theory, given that the questionWhy did you behave the way you did in the game?-was completely open-ended and, thus, subjects could have responded with a wide variety of reasons.
DISCUSSION
Results of the present research provided strong support for the position that the norm of equity can serve as the basis for coalition formation. These findings, and those of past research (e.g., Messe, 1971) , indicate that persons use equity to guide their behavior in bargaining situations. On the other hand, other variables-for example, concerns with competition-become more salient in circumstances such as the two control conditions in the present study, in which the norm of equity does not appear applicable.
The results clearly refute the hypothesis that Gamson (1964) derived from Minimum Resource Theory. This perspective was especially relevant to the present research, since it proposes explicitly that there exists a relationship between resource salience and coalition formation. It should be noted, however, that no theory of coalition formation (cf. Caplow, 1968; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Walker, 1973) predicts or explains adequately the formation of conservative coalitions that occurred in the input condition of the present research.
The failure of these theories seems to be a result of an assumption that persons, especially males, tend to approach situations of potential conflict with competitive orientation. Past research (e.g., Benton, 1971; Messe, 1971; Messe, Dawson, & Lane, 1973; Pepitone, 1971) , however, has demonstrated that this assumption may not be valid for many interpersonal situations, especially those in which it is possible to distribute rewards in a manner that is congruent with perceived inputs. This was the cage in the inputs condi-tion of the present study, so, as results indicated, theories that assume a competitive orientation cannot predict accurately subjects' responses.
Moreover, the results cannot be explained adequately in terms of demand characteristics. While it was possible that subjects in the inputs condition would deduce from the resource assignment that they were "expected" to form conservative coalitions, two important considerations render such an explanation implausible. First, subjects were recruited through the promise of money as their sole reward. Given this, it seems unlikely that they would behave in ways that could prove costly to them just to please the experimenter. Second, resources were assigned in the same manner in the inputs-prepaid condition, but subjects' responses differed substantially from those in the inputs condition. Thus, any demand characteristics that might have been present should have been esentially the same in the two inputs conditions, but, since coalition formation behavior differed, it is unlikely that such characteristics-if they were present at all-affected responses.
On the other hand, previous theories of coalition formation-especially Walker (1973) were predictive of the behavior that was emitted in both the inputs-prepaid and the no-inputs conditions. The purpose of the present research was not to differentiate among them, but rather to demonstrate that, as a class of theories, they are most applicable in situations in which persons should have a competitive orientation. The present study and prior research lead to the conjecture that a competitive orientation arises primarily in two situations. First, it appears that this orientation is generated when explicit rewards are trivial and/or not motivating in themselves (e.g., Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) . In this case, subjects-perhaps to relieve boredom-• may convert the situation to a zero-sum situation with little real cost. Second, competitive tendencies also can occur when the structures of inputs and rewards are such that an equitable solution is impossible. Lane and Messe (1972) , for example, have demonstrated that persons become self-interested when they distribute an amount of reward that is either insufficient or oversufficient to provide everyone with a fair share.
It is likely that the two control conditions of the present research generated a competitive orientation in subjects, since both were situations of oversufficient rewards. The noinput condition provided subjects with $9, a rather large amount of money for about 10 minutes of work. The inputs-prepaid condition gave subjects $9 in excess of the equitable amounts that were awarded to them previously.
An important issue that remains to be considered fully is the extent to which conditions in the "real-world" typically favor an equitable or a competitive orientation. While a definitive answer to this question must await extensive empirical exploration, it appears that a reasonable estimate is that the norm of equity is an important concern in most interpersonal situations. This speculation follows from the argument, developed by Thibaut and Kelley (1959, pp. 132-135) and others, that norms are widely used since they facilitate productive social behavior. Also, it seems reasonable that persons, in general, would believe in a just world in which, typically, differences in resources have some appropriate and rational basis.
Thus, for example, the contemporary American family-viewed as a father-mother-child triad-often may be characterized by a conservative, parental coalition. In fact, Fleck (1972) , argues that revolutionary parentchild coalitions are associated with behavior pathologies in the family-an assertion with which Caplow (1968, pp. 66-67) appears to disagree, however.
This, and other, points of contention, of course, cannot be resolved without relevant data. It is clear, however, from the findings of this and past research on coalition formation that there are factors which influence the type of coalition that characteristically is formed. Thus, it now appears to be appropriate to broaden the scope of the empirical and theoretical work in this field-from its present rather narrow focus on why revolutionary coalitions tend to be formed under conditions of equal pivotal power-to include the more general issue of when conservative or revolutionary coalitions are more likely to occur.
